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FAR EASTERN SECTION
THE SOVIET COURT AS A SOURCE OF LAW
JOHN N. HAZARD*
Common law lawyers feel themselves to be on unfamiliar ground
when they try to understand the law of the Continent. They have
learned to look at judicial decisions and to be sceptical of statutes until
they see how they are applied by the courts. Civil law lawyers have
not aided their common law colleagues. Civil law lawyers belittle the
importance of court decisions and present their codes alone for
examination.
Soviet law, as one of the civil law family, has likewise been pre-
sented usually in terms of statutes, both to Soviet law students and to
outsiders seeking to understand. There are no Soviet "casebooks."
Reported decisions exist but they are rarely brought to the attention
of foreigners. Soviet jurists have written at all times since the revolu-
tion that the Anglo-American system of judicial precedent is completely
foreign to the Soviet system of law Only recently has the function of
the Soviet court come into controversy and evoked special interest
among Soviet lawyers.
The debate aroused by the new interest among Soviet lawyers in
their court practice provides an occasion for the common law lawyer
to look at the work of Soviet courts. It is the purpose of this paper to
utilize the occasion. It may aid in providing appropriate materials for
continuing the examination of Soviet law begun in an earlier issue of
this Review 1
THE STAGES OF THE DEBATE
Until the middle years of World War II the writers of Soviet legal
texts adopted a uniform position as to the function of Soviet courts.
The courts were treated only as interpreters of the law, not as law-
makers. There was no concept similar to that sometimes called by the
American colloquialism "judge-made law" A standard text of 19381
* Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
'See Berman, The Spirit of Soviet Law, 23 WASH. L. REV. 152 (1948).2 VYsHInSKY, A. Y., SOVETSKOE GoSUDARSTVENNOE PRAVO 318 (Moscow, 1938).
Available in translation as THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE (New York, 1948).
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declares that legislation cannot anticipate everything, and so there is
necessity for court interpretation, but the work of the court goes no
farther.
A more precise statement of this position appeared in a text of z94o.
The authors wrote that "court practice cannot and must not create
new norms of law, new legislation; it must correspond with precision
to existing norms, it must bulwark existing statutes." The authors were
reserved, however, for they added that "to deny court precedent as a
source of law does not mean the denial of all guiding significance to
court practice."'
A change in emphasis was called for in 1943. An author, using the
civil code as his departure point, argued that Soviet court practice had
become a source of law, in that a judge is assured by Soviet legislation
of an opportunity to apply law in a creative way ' The author demon-
strated to his satisfaction that the opportunity was being availed of.
The argument as to whether the Soviet court is a source of law
extended into a general meeting of the Moscow Juridical Institute of
1946.' Professors and judges spoke both in favor of and against the
proposition that a Sovier court is a source of law The debate seems
to have resulted in a decision to reconsider the status of the court, for
a 1947 textbook" took the position that at least the guiding instructions
on questions of court practice, issued by the full bench (plenum) of
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and the instructions of the State
Arbitration System of the U.S.S.R. may be considered as sources of
law The authors still adhered to earlier principles in some measure,
for they added a cautionary phrase. They stated that "it must be
borne in mind that the significance of sources of law is applied to these
orders and instructions only in a very limited measure. Norms, col-
lected in the orders and instructions, are not new legal norms but only
expressions of existing legal norms in detailed form."
The issue is, apparently, still unsettled, for a 1948 Soviet legal
periodical has carried the report of a discussion in the Institute of Law
8 GOLUNSKY, S. A. and STRoGoviCH, M. S., TEORIYA GoSUDA1STVA I PRAVA 184(Moscow, 1940).
4 Id. at 185.
5 See Vilnyanski, S. I., Znacheme Sudenbnot Praktiks v Grazhdanskorn Prave,
published in VSESOYUZNYi INSTITUT YURMIICESiKxiK NAUK, MIN. YUST. S.S.S.R.,
UC3ENYE TRUDY, IX (M. '47). Editorial note states all material was in readiness for
publication in 1943.
6 Id. at 253.
7 SOTSALISTICHESKAYA ZAXONNOST, No. 9, 21 (1946).8 INSnTUT PRAVA AxADEMir NAUK S.S.S.R., OsNovY SOEVTSICOGo GOSUDARSTVA
r PRAVA 50 (Moscow, 1947).
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of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.' The principal speech
concerned the law of precedents in English and French practice; the
commentator following the speech saw a need for uniformity of prac-
tice in Soviet courts, although he urged that it be established without
any rigidity, such as he associated with a system of judicial precedent.
THE ARGUMENTS
Opposition to the proposition that Soviet courts are a source of
law has been founded on several arguments. Academician A. Y
Vyshinsky has drawn upon Soviet political theory which holds that
the Soviet system of government accepts no principle of "separation
of powers."'" In Vyshinsky's opinion the Montesquieu doctrine, as
carried into effect by the United States Supreme Court, permits that
court to create new legislation through constitutional interpretation.
The power to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional is in his
opinion the power to legislate in fact. He finds the position of the
Soviet court to be quite different.
The Soviet system of government gives no right of constitutional
review to the judiciary The judiciary, like the executive branch of
government, is subject completely to the will of the principal repre-
sentative body of the state, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. This
principal body delegates the judicial function to the courts, but the
latter are always responsible to it, and have no right to review its legis-
lative acts to determine whether they are constitutional. The Supreme
Soviet is its own judge as to whether a proposal requires adoption in
accordance with the procedure set forth in the Constitution for its
amendment.
Professors Golunsky and Strogovich argue that there is good prac-
tical reason why legislative authority can be the only source of law in
the Soviet system." They explain "that under the conditions of the
rigid organization of the Soviet state, of the planned activity of its
agencies and of the durable regime of socialist legality, the most com-
plete, precise and definable means of reflecting the will of the toiling
people of the Soviet country is legislation." They, therefore, exclude
custom as a source of law, except in very rare cases, as when a statute
establishes a rule in terms of custom to be determined in each case.
They argue that a court is deciding concrete cases and these are
9 Problema Sudenbnogo Pravotvorchestva, Doklady V I. Kainmskos & N P
Karadzhesskrova, SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, No. 2, 74 (1948).
10 Note 2 supra at 319.
11 Note 3 mrpra at 182.
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always individual. The decision in a case may have value as an
example in subsequent similar situations, but it cannot have the force
of law for such subsequent situations.
There is apparent m arguments of this nature the fact that Soviet
jurists share with their contemporaries in other civil law countries a
fear that courts may wander far from the provisions of a statute if
they are permitted to build an edifice of decisions, each one resting
upon the preceding one. Soviet jurists want the court to examine the
basic statute in each situation and start afresh as if it were a case of
first impression. They do not want a court to say that Judge Ivanov
interpreted the statute to cover situation A, and, therefore, they decide
in favor of the plaintiff, as situation B is a logical extension of the
doctrine established in situation A. They want the court to determine
whether situation B would fall within the terms of the statute even if
there were no decision relating to situation A.
All critics of the suggestion that Soviet courts are sources of law
rely upon the constitutional provisions relating to courts, arguing that
these give no such authority to the courts.
Proponents of the proposition that Soviet courts, or at least the full
bench (plenum) of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., are sources of
law rely mainly on practice. Professor Isaev has brought forth ex-
amples supporting the theory that in the guiding directives of the
Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. there is manifested the role of a force
creating law 12 He is not fully content with the evidence, however, for
he states that in order to decide the question one would have to study
the practice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. for a number of
years. He states that this work awaits investigation.
Mr. Vilnyanskii is less reserved in his conclusions based upon
practice. He not only finds much in practice to support the theory that
the Soviet court is a source of law, but he finds good reason in theory
why it should be."8 He states the familiar Soviet thesis that in a
capitalist society the court represents the most conservative class and
acts as a restraint upon the wishes of the masses insofar as those wishes
are reflected in legislation issuing from a popularly elected legislature.
Vilnyanskii proceeds with his argument, but omits a step which he
probably assumes his readers can take without the necessity of restate-
ment. To clarify the reasoning for American non-Marxists it may help
to remark that communists look with suspicion upon courts because
12 Note 9 supra.
1 Note 5 stepra at 244.
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of this reasoning. They consider them a restraint upon popular will, a
last barricade against the movement to the left, and for this reason they
support measures to restrict their power in capitalist societies. It may
be that the early Soviet jurists who devised the arguments against per-
mitting Soviet courts to be a source of law were motivated not alone
by the civil law tradition, but by an inherited fear of courts as reac-
tionary institutions.
With a background of appreciation of why Soviet jurists may have
had political reasons for mistrusting courts, Vilnyanskii's next step in
reasoning is clarified. He argues that in Soviet society there is no
political or class conflict between the court and the legislature, because
both institutions are agencies of the dictatorship of the working class
and reflect the legal conception of the toiling masses. In consequence,
he believes that court practice is able to work within the framework of
socialist law and to guide its development in the direction of construc-
tion of socialist society and the step-by-step transition to communist
society Thus, he argues, there is good reason in theory for recognizing
Soviet court practice as one of the sources of Soviet law, even though
it is of a lower rank than legislation.
Proponents of this position also rely upon statute. They argue that
Article 75 of the Judiciary Act gives to the court the right to fill in
gaps in the law, and this implies the power to create law 14
THE EVIDENCE
The statutory materials on which both proponents and opponents of
the proposition that the Soviet court is a source of law rely are scanty
The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the U.S.S.R. in general terms." This jurisdiction may be lim-
ited-and Vyshinsky thinks it is-by the authority given to the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to "give interpretations
of the laws of the U.S.S.R. in operation."' 8 The Constitution gives no
such authority to the courts.
The Judiciary Act of 193811 has two pertinent sections: 2 and 75.
34 See argument of Judge Smolitskii in opposition to what was apparently an argu-
ment of Professor Isaev, note 7 supra.
15 Art. 104. "The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is the highest judicial organ. The
Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities
of all the judicial organs of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republics."
10 Const. Art. 49 (c).
17 For English translation, see Second Session of the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R., August 10-21, 1938, VERBATIM REPORT, 662 (Moscow, 1938).
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Section 2 seems to be restrictive." Section 75 seems to give broader
authority to the court, and as stated above, it is the statutory bulwark
of those who believe the court to be a source of law 19 Its terminology
does not, however, mention specifically the filling of gaps.
The statutory materials seem to give no complete answer. Inciden-
tally, they indicate a procedure which will be unfamiliar to the Amen-
can lawyer and which is important in understanding the work of the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and the Supreme
Courts of the Republics, unlike the United States Supreme Court, hear
cases in benches of three judges, and only review cases having impor-
tance transcending their immediate facts before the full bench of all
judges in what is called a plenary sitting.20 The court practice of the
U.S.S.R. is, therefore, composed both of decisions on individual sets
of facts reported in the form common to American courts, and instruc-
tions, which are brief statements of a rule, "distilled" from a concrete
situation, but the facts of the case are not restated in the instruction.
The instructions are, therefore, of general application and do not lend
themselves to the process of "distinguishing" as easily as is the case
when a concrete set of facts is present for analysis.
Since statutory materials are not sufficient to reach a definite con-
clusion in the debate, proponents of the theory that the Soviet court is
a source of law rely primarily upon practice. So that the American
reader may see for himself how an article of the code is expanded upon
and by what agencies, the crime of "speculation" has been selected as
a case study
INTERPRETING THE CRIME OF "SPECULATION"
The crime of "speculation" was first placed by the legislature in the
criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R.2' in 1926 as Article 107 It was then
defined as "malicious increase in the price of commodities by means
of cornering, concealing or boycott of commodities on the market."
18", It is the task of justice in the U.S.S.R. to secure the strict and undeviating
observance of Soviet laws by all institutions, organizations, official persons and citizens
of the U.S.S.R."
2s "Protests against sentences, judgments or orders of the collegiums of the Supreme
Court of the U.S.S.R. filed by the President of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. or
the Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. are heard by a Plenary Sitting of the Supreme Court of
the U.S.S.R. called for this purpose, which likewise gives guiding instructions on ques-
tions in the judicial cases examined by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R."
20 Details as to structure and jurisdiction of all courts may be found in Hazard,
Sovit Agencies of Law, 21 NomE DAME LAwYER 69 (1945).
21 The R.S.F.S.R. is the largest of the Soviet Republics and its codes have served
as models for the others. There is, as yet, no federal criminal code, although one is in
preparation.
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The penalty was to be increased if there were a conspiracy on the part
of merchants.
The legislature amended the code in 193222 so that the crime became
the "purchase or resale by private persons, for gain [%.e., as a specu-
lation], of any agricultural produce or of any article of mass consump-
tion." The 1932 phrasing has remained to the present day The
penalty was set as "deprivation of liberty for a period of not less than
five years and confiscation of goods in whole or in part." The 1932
revision occurred as a result of a federal decree of the legislature of
the U.S.S.R. setting forth the danger seen in speculation and calling
for internment of offenders in a concentration camp for periods from
five to ten years without the right of amnesty 23
Within a month after its enactment, the application of Article 107
was extended by an order of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. to
reach persons who failed to take up ration books from workers who
were dismissed or who issued ration books illegally, if such acts were
accompanied by speculation in the goods obtained thereby The next
year the Comnissariat of Justice extended the application of Article
107 by ordering that wealthy peasants (kulaks) who failed to make the
required grain deliveries to the state within the period set were to be
prosecuted as speculators.' The court was aided in its extension of
Article 107 and cases to be discussed below by the fact that the criminal
code permits prosecution of socially dangerous acts as crimes when the
code does not specifically define them as crimes. This is done under
Article 16, by way of "analogy" to appropriate articles of the code.
Two orders of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. during the
winter of 1933-34 extended the Article further. One declared that the
resale of wine, liquors, and other spirits at prices in excess of the set
prices was a crime of speculation. The other stated that the buying up
of the collective farmers' expectancies in future distribution of pro-
duce ("labor days"), if done systematically, was to be treated as the
crime of speculation.25
Persons guilty of buying state bonds at less than face amount for
the purpose of resale as a business were placed under the provisions of
Article 107 by the order of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R. in
22 COLLECTION OF LAWS, R.S.F.S.R., 1932, No. 87, Art. 385.
23 Decree of 22 Aug. 1932. COLLECTION oF LAWS, U.S.S.R., 1932, No. 65, Art. 375.
24 See annotation to Art. 107 in edition of 1934. (This annotation was removed from
the 1935 edition.)
25 See annotation to 1934 edition of Code.
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935.2" This order of the Supreme Court of the Republic was replaced
four months later by an explanation of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R. to the same effect, but adding some additional provisions, such
as activity of this character when conducted by organized groups was
counterrevolution, to be prosecuted under Article 5877
An extension of the Article was ordered by the Supreme Court of the
R.S.F.S.R. in 1934, but not published as an annotation to the code
until 1937 Under this order it was declared that the production of a
secret flour mill, even by hand power, by former bourgeois elements or
even by toilers, if conducted as a business and for the purpose of
making a profit, was to be treated as the crime of speculation. A further
extension was made in a directing letter of the Supreme Court and
Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in 1935 to the effect that Article 107 should
be applied to persons who pounded up state metal money into metal
sheets and objects for sale.2"
A halt was called to what was apparently broad application of
Article 107 by lower courts, when the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
issued an order on December 3, 1938.29 Lower courts were admon-
ished to investigate the personality of the accused in every case of
alleged speculation and to verify all facts carefully so that it would be
thoroughly established that the defendant had bought up and resold,
or had bought up for resale, goods of agriculture and mass consumption
for the purpose of making a profit. The court stated that toilers were
not to be tried for retaining and selling agricultural produce and goods
of mass consumption belonging to them, if it is not proved that these
products and articles were bought up and resold for the purpose of
making a profit.
A 1940 order of the Supreme Court reversed the trend."0 While it
restated the admonitions of the 1938 order, it stated that if there were
no direct evidence of purchase for resale as a business, the court nught
rest upon circumstantial evidence, based upon the quantity, the assort-
ment, the needs of the accused and his family for the goods purchased
for his own needs and the other circumstances of the case. In such a
situation Article 107 should be applied together with Article ig. The
28 See annotation to 1935 edition of Code.
27 See annotation to 1936 edition of Code.
2 8 See SBORNIK DEISTVUYUSHCHIKH POSTANOVLENII PLENUMA i DIREKTIVNYKH
PISEM VERKHoVNOGO SUDA S.S.S.R. 1924-1944 47 (Moscow, 1946).2 0 This order was not printed as an annotation to Art. 107 until the edition of the
Code in 1943.
so See annotation to 1943 edition of Code.
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latter Article provides that preparation to commit a crime may be
treated in the same manner as commission of the crime, depending on
the court's feeling as to the measure of social danger represented in
the defendant.
With the reintroduction of rationing at the outset of war in 1941, the
Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R. issued an order that specula-
tion in ration coupons be prosecuted under Article 107 1 This reinsti-
tuted the practice formerly ordered by the Supreme Court of the
R.S.F.S.R. in 1932 and subsequently dropped when rationing was
eliminated. It may be pertinent to the discussion of this paper to point
out that the order came from a court in 1932 and from the executive
in 1941.
The buying up of raw materials to manufacture "moonshine liquor"
and the sale of liquor subsequently, or the purchase of liquor for
resale was to be punished under Article 107, according to an order of
the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. of December 24,
1942.32
The courts must have had considerable experience with the crime
of speculation immediately after the war for the Plenum of the
Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. issued an extensive order on September
20, 1946." s The lower courts were criticized in this order for their
unsatisfactory struggle with speculation. It was stated that they were
often giving conditional sentences or fining rather than sentencing a
defendant to the minimum term of five years provided for in Article
107 The jurisdiction to try cases in which large quantities of property
were concerned or cases in which state-owned property was concerned
was taken out of the People's Courts by the order and transferred to
the Provincial Courts, who were to sit in such cases as courts of
original jurisdiction.
EVIDENCE FROM CIVIL LAW PRACTICE
The practice of Soviet courts in applying the civil code has impressed
exponents of the theory that Soviet courts are a source of law The
civil code has some general terms in its articles, and courts are called
upon to give meaning to them. In so doing, it is argued, they are making
law For example, Article 421 of the civil code of the R.S.F.S.R. pro-
vides that all personal property of a decedent related to usual house-
31 See annotation to 1943 edition of Code.
32 See annotation to 1943 edition of Code.
33 See annotation to 1947 edition of Code, p. 180.
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hold needs passes to the heirs who are living with the decedent, rather
than being divided among all heirs, regardless of where they are resi-
dent. To this general rule, there is an exception for "articles of luxury"
The court determines in each case what are such articles. At one time
it may be a grand piano. Vilnyanskii thinks that at another time a
grand piano might not be a luxury when the cultural level of society
has been raised." The court would be the agency to make the decision.
Definitions are likewise called for from the court in defining force
majeure in any case in which impossibility of controlling a dangerous
element is pleaded as a defense to a tort action. The problem of court
interpretation is prominent in all tort cases, due to the general termi-
nology of the pertinent articles of the civil code. Perhaps the broadest
extension of a court's authority would arise if there is general applica-
tion of a rule urged by a text writer in 1938.11 It was argued at that
time that a court in applying tort law to cases in which an individual
had violated "the rules of socialist intercourse," to which Article 130.
of the Constitution requires adherence, could hold the individual liable
if he were healthy and knew how to swim, yet "failed to render aid in
the summer time to another person who was drowning in a river not far
from its bank." There has been no reported case of this nature, and
Vilnyanskii doubts whether a court will go so far. Vilnyanskii sees the
necessity of the court's making law, however, if the obligation to obey
the rules of socialist intercourse is to be a reality
Considerable latitude was given the court under Article z of the civil
code. Under Article i the court is permitted not to apply a provision
of the civil code if it feels that the party relying upon the provision
has abused it. Many decisions were handed down during the 192o'S."6
While the courts are no longer finding it necessary to rely on this
article to administer what they believe to be justice, the court formerly
established remedies and demed remedies under it, when these reme-
dies were available or not available under the other articles of the code.
In doing so the court may have been making law
CONCLUSION
A common law lawyer will find much in Soviet court practice which
corresponds with his understanding of the function of court§. The
34 Note 5 supra, at 268.
35 GRAzEDAxSKOxE PRAvo Vol. 2, 392 (Moscow, 1938).
301 For an analysis of the decisions, see Greaves, Social-Economic Purpose of Private
Rights. Sec. 1 of the Soviet Civil Code. A Comparative Study of Soviet Non-Commul-
nist Law, 12 N.Y.U. LAW Q. REv. 165 and 439 (1934-5).
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extension of the Soviet crime of speculation is mindful of the work of
the courts of England when they defined the common law crimes cen-
turies ago. It would be hard for a Soviet lawyer to sustain an argument
that law was not made when an article of the code defining as specula-
tion the purchase or resale for gain of any agricultural produce or of
any article of mass consumption was extended to cover ration books,
silver and copper currency, state bonds, and probably even "labor
days." The broadening of the crime to include ownership of articles in
excess of personal needs on the ground that such ownership was cir-
cumstantial evidence of the intent to resell for gain may also be an
extension of law and not merely a rule relating to the evaluation of
evidence.
On the other hand, a common law lawyer would probably be less
enthusiastic than Vilnyanskii in finding the civil law cases as evidence
that the court was making law In these cases the court was provided
rules in general terms, and in defining items of luxury or force Majeure
in each case, it would be clearly within the limitations of the intent of
the legislature. The record is not sufficiently complete to permit exami-
nation of whether subsequent decisions followed the rulings blindly, in
which case one rmght argue that the court had made law Even in cases
of the application of the principle of Article i of the civil code, there
would not seem to be lawmaking unless the rule in one case were made
binding upon courts in the future.
Perhaps the conclusion is warranted that Soviet courts are required
to adhere more closely to statutory law than in the present-day common
law jurisdictions which often provide no statute governing the matter
in issue, but that the Soviet court has considerably greater latitude in
its operations than the strict constructionists believe when they argue
that it is not a source of law at all but only an agency to interpret and
apply rules of law which the legislature has enacted.
